Energy Competition: From Commodity to Boutique & Back by Coleman, James W.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206797 
ENERGY COMPETITION:  
FROM COMMODITY TO BOUTIQUE AND BACK  
James W. Coleman* 
Forthcoming in  
COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS (Klaus Mathis ed., Springer 2019). 
ABSTRACT:  Energy products such as power, gas, and oil have long 
been the world’s premier commodities. Consumers demand that power 
and fuel are available when they want it and they prefer to pay less for 
it. Few know or care where their fuel or power comes from. So for years 
energy companies believed that efforts to differentiate their products 
were mostly ineffective—they were re-signed to compete on price in 
fierce global commodity markets. But in recent years, a new focus on 
regulating how energy commodities are produced has begun to splinter 
previously integrated energy markets, creating markets for boutique 
fuels and power, and allowing energy firms to restrict output and raise 
prices without fear of competition. 
This Article documents the causes and effects of this trend toward bou-
tique energy markets. It shows how consumer-driven supply-chain cer-
tifications that call for environmentally sound production methods have 
gradually evolved into government-mandated production standards. 
These standards take identical commodities—barrels of oil or kilowatt-
hours of electricity—and differentiate them based on how they were 
produced. Most typically, products that were produced using particularly 
greenhouse gas intensive methods are banned or otherwise penalized. 
These supply-chain standards have been adopted by countries, but in-
creasingly also by individual provinces, states, and localities. As a result, 
they are breaking the trade links in global energy supply chains. To sell 
in each of these markets, energy companies must be able to certify the 
production methods used by their entire supply chain. To do this, they 
must either control the entire vertical supply chain or only deal with the 
subset of companies that is prepared to meet the regulatory require-
ments of each jurisdiction that might import fuel or oil. Inevitably, this 
is increasing concentration of power and fuel markets.  
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The Article suggests how to turn energy back into a commodity without 
sacrificing the goals of the supply-chain standards. It suggests that juris-
diction specific supply-chain standards be replaced with one or two 
agreed supply-chain standards that would allow more energy companies 
to compete across jurisdictions. And it offers recommendations for how 
competition and energy regulators can work together to ensure that en-
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1. THE FALL OF ENERGY COMMODITIES  
& THE RISE OF BOUTIQUE ENERGY 
 
uel and power have long been archetypal commodities. Consum-
ers demand cheap gasoline and electricity and for decades they 
paid little attention to the brands that they are consuming. Absent 
any kind of customer loyalty, producers were forced to compete ruth-
lessly on price, driving down the cost of energy. 
In the last twenty years, however, consumers have begun to favor 
energy commodities produced in particular ways: “green power,” “ethi-
cal oil,” and “clean fuels.”1 Of course, how energy is produced generally 
has no impact on the final product. Electricity on a power grid is all the 
same, no matter whether it was produced by the wind, the sun, splitting 
an atom, or burning a lump of coal. Gasoline sold to consumers is all the 
same, no matter where suppliers purchased the oil that was refined to 
produce it. Ethanol is all identical, no matter whether it was produced 
from a sustainable agricultural system or from slash-and-burn farming. 
Yet, consumers have begun distinguishing between each of these physi-
cally identical products, insisting that they be produced by certain meth-
ods. In response, companies are now turning to third-parties that can 
certify their sustainable production practices. 
In the past ten years, government standards have extended this 
trend toward scrutiny of energy supply chains, mandating that energy 
products be produced by certain methods.2 States like California and 
provinces like Quebec and Ontario now require that when power com-
panies import electricity, they pay for the greenhouse gas emissions as-
sociated with producing that power in other jurisdictions. And the Eu-
ropean Union and the United States now require that a percentage of 
fuel imports be produced using methods that limit greenhouse gas emis-
sions abroad. California and other states and Canadian provinces have 
even more aggressive targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
from energy supply chains in other jurisdictions. 
                                                      
 
1 Ruhl and Salzman, 2018. 
2 Coleman, 2014. 
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These new supply chain regulations have one massive upside for 
the energy companies that they target: they splinter an undifferentiated 
commodity market. Before these regulations, the only way that an energy 
company could sell more of its product was to undercut all other fuel 
and power producers, providing lower prices to energy consumers. Now 
there is another path, an energy company can carve out its own niche, 
selling in nations or provinces where few other companies can provide 
fuel and power that combines with the diverse production standards re-
quired in each jurisdiction.  
Every commodity producer dreams it can brand its product so 
consumers will purchase it even when it is more expensive than the com-
petition.3 This is what producers hoped to accomplish by labeling their 
fuel and power products as “green,” “ethical,” and “clean.” For energy 
producers, legal supply chain standards are better than a dream come 
true: the government requires consumers buy their product over identical 
cheaper products. Energy companies have been quick to take advantage 
of these requirements, raising prices in niche markets where only a few 
producers can provide compliant fuels. Accordingly, liquid fuel in these 
jurisdictions have come to be known as “boutique fuels.” This Article 
adopts this colloquialism to describe a similar process in electricity mar-
kets, labeling these high-priced fuel and power products, produced by 
jurisdiction-approved methods, as “boutique energy.”  
 
2. HOW COMPANIES EXPLOIT BOUTIQUE ENERGY MARKETS 
 
When a jurisdiction adopts a supply-chain standard for previously 
undifferentiated energy commodities it limits competition in several 
ways. For one thing, if a fuel or power company wants to sell in this 
jurisdiction it must be able to certify how its product was created. Energy 
supply chains frequently extend around the globe, which makes this a 
challenge, particularly for fuel companies that may purchase oil from dif-
ferent sides of the globe on a daily and unpredictable basis. Only two 
kinds of companies can compete in a market with supply chain stand-
ards: vertically-integrated companies that control all stages of production 
and companies large and sophisticated enough to monitor all compo-
nents of their supply chain. 
                                                      
 
3 McQuiston, 2004; Sinclair & Seward, 1988.  




The largest, vertically-integrated companies are better able to ac-
count for greenhouse gas emissions throughout their supply chain. 
These vertically-integrated companies often control all the significant 
greenhouse gas emissions in the supply chain of their delivered fuels—a 
company like ExxonMobil often extracts oil and gas, gathers these fuels, 
refines them, and distributes them to final end-users.4 This means the 
company can measure and control emissions along its entire supply 
chain, making compliance with boutique fuel mandates a simple optimi-
zation process. 
Even when no companies control the entire energy supply chain, 
larger companies are afforded advantages in complying with supply 
chain standards.5 First, they typically have the resources required to ac-
count for emissions throughout their complex supply chains. Smaller 
companies often lack the systems, software, and human resources to 
comprehensively track how each of their suppliers creates their prod-
ucts.6 Second, they typically have enough leverage with suppliers to de-
mand that they account for their greenhouse gas emissions. They may 
even have enough leverage to demand that their suppliers improve their 
emissions performance.  
Finally, energy supply chain standards are sometimes intended to 
have anti-competitive effects. For example, when California adopted its 
low carbon fuel standard, which mandates that transportation fuels con-
sumed in the state be produced by low-carbon methods, limiting com-
petition from out-of-state producers was one of its stated aims.7 To this 
end, it exempted domestic oil producers from its regulation and altered 
federal estimates of greenhouse gas emissions to favor its domestic eth-
anol production. This is the global pattern: when jurisdictions consider 
the supply chain of energy, their controversial assumptions systemati-
cally favor domestic energy producers over foreign ones.8 
                                                      
 
4 Rostow, 1952. 
5 Preuss 2005 
6 Pagell & Wu, 2009. 
7 Coleman, 2014. 
8 Coleman, 2018a. 
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Jurisdictions that adopt supply chain standards see a decrease in 
competition and an increase in prices. Companies that can corner these 
markets are insulated from competition and reaping large financial re-
wards. For this reason, oil refiners often favor boutique fuel standards 
that will insulate them from competition.9 
Thus, it is no surprise that in California—the state with the most 
unique and highly-developed fuel standards—fuel providers earn the 
highest profit margins.10 Gasoline prices are much higher in California 
than in other U.S. states and the additional cost of producing California-
specific fuel accounts for only a fraction of that cost.11  
The ruthless competition that otherwise keeps energy prices in 
check is unable to operate in California. Small companies often do not 
have the sophistication to comply with the state’s convoluted fuel re-
quirements. Even if they did, they would still have to purchase from the 
few refineries that can comply with the state’s fuel mandates.12 And of 
course, a single, isolated state market, even one as big as California, is 
not large enough to support many competing oil refiners. Just two oil 
companies—Chevron & Tesoro—control 60% of California’s gasoline 
market. Two more—Valero & Phillips 66—control 30% more.13 
Even worse, when local refiners cannot produce enough fuel for 
a boutique market like California, refiners outside the jurisdiction cannot 
make up the shortage because they do not manufacture fuel that meets 
its standards. Refining facilities all have maximum capacities, so in-state 
refiners simply ramp up their prices until demand falls into balance with 
supply—often at prices that far exceed the refiner’s cost of production. 
Thus boutique refiners benefit both from consistently elevated margins 
and regular windfalls caused by temporary shortages. These elevated 
prices are recompense they receive for being one of the few companies 
                                                      
 
9 Peterson & Mahnovski (2003). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. ; Borenstein et al., 2004; Wolak, 2004.  
12 Powers, 2012. 
13 California Energy Commission, 2018. So these four companies control 
90% of California’s refining capacity. By contrast, in Texas, the top four refin-
ers control just 60%, the top two companies control only 40%. 
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willing to make significant capital investment dependent on a single mar-
ket and able to navigate its complex and demanding regulations. And 
that price is paid by consumers in California and other states with these 
boutique fuel standards. 
California’s fuel standards are just one example of how boutique 
energy standards for fuel and power are fracturing global energy markets. 
Numerous other jurisdictions have adopted hese standards for produc-
ing fuels using lower carbon methods, which are often misleadingly la-
beled “low carbon fuel standards:”14 the United Kingdom, the European 
Union, Oregon, the United States, and British Columbia.15 Canada and 
the U.S. state of Washington are in the process of adopting their own 
standards for fuel production.16 Each time a new jurisdiction adopts 
ones of these new standards, it limits the suppliers that can provide it 
with fuel. 
These fuel-production standards are just one type of standard 
that is fractioning previously integrated fuel markets—in fact, they are 
really the third wave of boutique fuel standards. It begin in 1990 when 
the U.S. Congress mandated that areas with poor air quality adopt 
cleaner-burning Federal Reformulated Gasoline. Shortly thereafter states 
and cities that were not addressed by this mandate often began adopting 
their own standards for fuel that was not quite as exacting as the federal 
mandate but somewhat less expensive.17 As these boutique fuel stand-
ards threatened to break-up the national refining market, Congress 
stepped in and froze the number of standards in the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005: from now on when states wanted to introduce a new fuel stand-
ard they would have to find a pre-existing one to retire. 
Although the Energy Policy Act of 2005 stopped further frag-
mentation in standards for clean-burning fuels it set off a different kind 
of fragmentation in renewable fuel mandates. The Act also mandated 
                                                      
 
14 All ethanol has the same amount of carbon, as does all finished gasoline. 
After all, breaking the carbon chains in the fuel is what powers the engine. 
These standards mostly address the amount of carbon that is emitted in creat-
ing the fuel, not the amount of carbon in the fuel. Coleman, 2014. 
15 Baral, 2009; Scott, 2017. 
16 Id. 
17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005. 
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that U.S. transportation fuels contain increasing volumes of ethanol. But 
perhaps more importantly, states followed up this effort with their own 
renewable fuel mandates—10 states now have mandates for specified 
volumes and types of biofuels.18 These biofuel standards, layered on top 
of the clean-burning fuel standards, set the stage for the third wave of 
boutique fuel standards, the low carbon fuel standards that are now be-
ing adopted in jurisdictions across North America and the globe. Thus 
in many jurisdictions, gasoline, once the archetypal commodity, is now 
provided by just a few retailers with significant market power. 
In recent years, the trend toward boutique energy has spread to 
electricity markets. In the United States, states are the principal regula-
tors of electricity pricing and until 1980 most electricity was sold by ver-
tically-integrated monopoly utilities subject to cost-of-service regulation. 
But over the past forty years the U.S. Congress, the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission, and state policymakers have gradually moved much 
of the United States to competitive energy markets: forcing monopoly 
utilities to sell their power plants, transmit power for competing power 
providers, and authorizing market-based pricing.19 As a result, a national 
electricity market has emerged that allows previously isolated state mar-
kets to benefit from the increased liquidity and competition provided by 
a larger market.20 Building this national market has grown particularly 
crucial because it can bring cheap renewable power from the interior 
plains and deserts to the Midwestern, Southern, and Coastal states where 
power is most needed.21 
This integration would seem to be natural and beneficial: after all, 
as long as electricity meets its specifications for voltage and frequency it 
would hardly seem to matter where it comes from. Indeed, once elec-
tricity leaves a power plant, there is no way to tell where that electricity 
“went”—instead it contributes to a common pool of voltage that is 
drawn off by each consumer. So if a power plant in a neighboring state 
                                                      
 
18 The states are Hawaii, Florida, Oregon, and Missouri, Montana, 
Pennsylvanian, Washington, Louisiana, Iowa, Kansas. United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (2015).  
19 Joskow, 2008; Coleman, 2018b. 
20 Butters & Spulber, 2013.  
21 Coleman, 2018c. 
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can provide that power more cheaply than a local plant, there seems little 
reason to prevent it. 
Nevertheless, this integration is now threatened by the rise of be-
spoke power standards. At the beginning of the new millennium many 
states begin adopting “renewable portfolio standards” that specified that 
a certain percentage of electricity had to come from renewable power 
sources such as wind, solar, and hydroelectric power; more than half of 
the United States have now adopted such standards.22 These standards 
are remarkable because they do not prescribe how power is produced within 
the state—that would be a natural matter of state concern because of the 
different environmental problems caused by power sources such as coal 
and oil power. Instead, they prescribe how power consumed within the state 
may be produced, no matter where it is produced. This is an odd choice 
because power consumption is identical regardless of how it was pro-
duced. But this choice means that the state cannot import power unless 
out-of-state producers can track and control their supply chains to the 
satisfaction of the importing state. 
When these renewable portfolio standards were introduced, they 
had little effect on state-to-state electricity trade because their goals were 
modest—they often set aside less than 10% of state electricity for these 
bespoke energy standards. Now, however, these standards are ramping 
up, with some scheduled to reach 40, 50, or even 75% in coming years. 
As these standards grow stricter, they will have a more severe impact on 
state-to-state energy trade. And they are now being further complicated 
with more standards for imported electricity—California, for instance, 
now forces imports to account and pay for all greenhouse gases emitted 
during the course of electricity production. Thus, it will be increasingly 
difficult to trade electricity on a commodity basis. Producers will not be 
able to offer power based on price and quantity—instead they will have 
to account for numerous other attributes. Was the electricity low-car-
bon? How much so? Was it solar power? Or wind? The United States 
brief experiment with commodity electricity markets may fragment into 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction boutique power markets. 
 
                                                      
 
22 Wiser et al., 2007. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206797 
ENERGY COMPETITION 
10 
3. MAKING ENERGY A COMMODITY AGAIN 
 
The very foundation of modern competition law—its justifica-
tion and its origin—was in the battle to make commodity markets func-
tion as they should.23 The first trust-busters broke up companies that 
attempted to corner markets in industrial production of oil, tobacco, and 
steel. The reward of this work was a century of unending competition in 
fuel markets. And the most important trend of the last four decades in 
power markets has been the introduction of competition to markets that 
had previously operated by monopoly. This progress is now endangered 
by boutique energy standards that are splintering previously integrated 
energy markets and creating niches where fuel and power companies can 
exercise inordinate market power. To make energy a commodity again, 
regulators should take three steps. 
First, this danger can be mitigated by harmonizing supply-chain 
standards across different jurisdictions. If jurisdictions can agree on what 
kind of fuel and power is “clean” or “ethical,” energy companies will be 
able to compete in multiple jurisdictions. And smaller companies will 
find it easier to comply with a single standard: they will not have to nav-
igate a maze of conflicting regulations and their suppliers, faced with a 
unified standard, will be ready and willing to comply. And if jurisdictions 
had to harmonize their supply-chain standards, they could no longer dis-
criminate against foreign producers.24 
The difficulty with harmonizing fuel and power standards is that 
some of their appeal is the ability to fend off foreign imports and pre-
scribe standards for other jurisdictions. Ultimately, to harmonize state 
standards may require federal intervention requiring harmonized stand-
ards. To harmonize standards between countries, countries will have to 
address this issue during trade talks. Environmental groups will be wary 
of subjecting domestic energy regulation to trade negotiations.25 But har-
monized fuel and power production standards would also be more pro-
tective of the environment because they would focus the standards on 
commonly agreed environmental metrics rather than protectionist dis-
tractions. 
                                                      
 
23 Posner, 2009; Peritz, 2000. 
24 Coleman, 2014. 
25 Esty, 2001. 
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Second, competition and energy regulators should work together 
to ensure that energy supply chain standards do not harm consumers. 
Energy regulators should consider the tradeoff between controlling pro-
duction standards and encouraging competition. To do this, they should 
consult with competition regulators who can provide them with analysis 
and advice on how the regulations that they are contemplating could 
impact energy competition. This advice would allow energy regulators 
to decide whether it would be worth it to simplify or even forgo certain 
standards if they would have a severe impact on energy competition. At 
a minimum, competition regulators could guide energy regulators to-
ward supply-chain standards that would have a smaller impact on com-
petition. For example, if these supply chain standards were harmonized 
with the other jurisdictions where the state’s energy competitors operate, 
they would have little impact on competition. 
Third, at a minimum, when supply-chain standards are adopted, 
competition regulators should monitor carefully for signs that compa-
nies are unlawfully exploiting market power. Unfortunately, boutique en-
ergy standards grant the remaining companies market power that they 
will naturally exploit without taking any unlawful steps. These supply 
chain standards are, in practice, anti-competitive and companies with 
market power will charge more than the marginal cost of production. 
But competition regulators should monitor to ensure that these anti-
competitive regulations are not exacerbated by anti-competitive and un-




The trail-blazing trust-busters of competition law broke up mo-
nopolists who had cornered commodity markets such as oil, tobacco, 
and steel. And no wonder that companies like Standard Oil worked so 
hard for a monopoly: without a monopoly, consumers would simply 
choose the cheapest fuel, and the prospect of endless cost-cutting might 
dampen the spirits of the most ardent titan of industry. In recent years, 
however, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction standards for producing fuel and 
power have created a new opening for market power in the energy in-
dustry. These boutique energy standards have fragmented markets for 
gasoline and electricity and allowed energy companies to substantially 
raise their prices. It is past time for energy regulators to begin consider-
ing the impact of their fuel and power standards on energy competition 
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and to begin working together to ensure that these standards do not 
break down cross-border trade. Energy and competition regulators in 
neighboring jurisdiction can ensure that new energy regulations do not 
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